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ARTICLE

Public Resource Ownership
and Community Engagement
in a Modern Energy Landscape
SAMANTHA HEPBURN*
The most important structural solution to the rush toward
final disormatteider is to restore some harmony between human
laws and the laws of nature by giving law back to networks of
communities.
- Fritjof Capra & Ugo Mattei, “The Ecology of Law”

Property belongs to a family of words that, if we can free them
from the denigrations that shallow politics and social fashion
have imposed on them, are the words, the ideas, that govern our
connections with the world and with one another:
property, proper, appropriate, propriety.
- Wendell Berry

*Director, Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Law, Deakin Law
School, Australia. The author would like to thank the all of participants in her
2016 seminar at the Harvard Environmental Policy Unit for their helpful
contributions.
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INTRODUCTION

Spectacular increases in global energy demand over the last
few decades have prompted a corresponding expansion in onshore
energy production, facilitated by innovative and enabling
technological advancements.1 Within this context, existing
resource ownership frameworks have been subjected to increasing
conflict and tension.2 This has been particularly apparent in public
1. See Ross H. Pifer, A Greener Shade of Blue: Technology and the Shale
Revolution, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134 (2013) (arguing
that the technological revolution that underpins the development of shale has
been responsible for reshaping the United States energy economy).
2. See Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of
Environmental Law: A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005 (2013)
(discussing the connectivity between energy growth and resource conflict and
highlighting importance of implementing a new cultural narrative that looks
beyond the paradigm of economic growth.); see also Carol M. Rose & Shelley Rose
Saxer, A Prospective Look at Property Rights, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 721 (2013)
(where the authors discuss the increasing tensions in ownership paradigms); INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS (2016), http://www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld_Statistics_2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VJG7-E595] (providing a statistical analysis of the advancements); U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INT’L ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ4B-JCP4] (Over the past
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resource frameworks, where ownership regimes have struggled to
respond to interface schisms between public and private
entitlements and escalating demand for greater community
involvement in onshore resource development.3 The deceleration of
fossil fuel production has contributed to these conflicts because the
focus is increasingly shifting towards the acceleration of onshore
gas as a strategic transitional resource within a carbon economy.4
The scale and form of the conflict in Australia has highlighted core
structural deficiencies in the public resource framework.5 Public
resource ownership is grounded in the disaggregation of private
land from state resource ownership. The implicit assumption is
that sub-strata resources should be vested in the state because the
state has the administrative capability to reinject the benefits of
resource exploitation back into the community. The public interest
obligations of the state, as resource owner, are assumed to reside
in efficiency imperatives. The income generated from sub-strata
resource exploitation is collected by the state and managed for the
benefit of the public as a whole.6
In a modern public resource framework, the justification for
state ownership of sub-surface resources has, however, become
increasingly unclear. As Huffman has stated, we presume that the
public management of resources is preferable to the private,
decade, Australia’s domestic gas production has increased by 3.5% and
approximately 20% of that gas comes from coal bed methane production in
onshore basins. The United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA)
has estimated that technically recoverable onshore shale gas deposits in Australia
to be 396 trillion cubic feet, which is enough gas to meet Australia’s current needs
for the next 396 years).
3. See Shannon O’Lear & Paul F. Diehl, The Scope of Resource Conflict: A
Model of Scale, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 27 (2011) (the authors outline
three core elements instrumental to the expansion of resource conflict, those
being: location, the nature of the stakeholders and the relationship that exists
between stakeholders).
4. See generally INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2011),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/goldenageofgas [https://perma.cc/R422-J4LL]
(describing the existing era as the ‘golden age of gas’).
5. See Tina Hunter & Michael Weir, Property Rights and Coal Seam Gas
Extraction: The Modern Property Law Conundrum, 2 PROP. L. REV. 71, 77 (2012).
6. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 59-60 (1987); see
generally Ian Murray, The Mineral Resource Rent Tax Is Dead, Long Live
Resource Rent Taxes?, 40 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 111 (2015) (in Australia, even this
assumption is questionable, given the capacity of the resource sector to minimize
tax given the broad concessions available under the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax
Assessment Act).
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however, this presumption is grounded in coded behaviour.7 The
actual situation is that public management of resources limits or
controls the way in which private or special interests affect
resource allocation. Thus, if the objective is to maximise the net
benefits to all members of society, whilst at the same time ensuring
fairness in the costs and benefits of that management, it is by no
means clear that this is achieved by the conferral of controlled
ownership of public resources in the state.8
This article argues the social, environmental and ecological
complexity of onshore resource expansion requires a corresponding
expansion in the public interest responsibilities owed by the state,
as public resource owner. Public interest should not be treated as
a presumptive fact and must involve a vigorous investigation by
the state of the benefit and utility of each resource development
proposal. This must necessarily include a thorough evaluation of
all competing interests. A critical element in this process is the
inclusion of community participation processes, ensuring that
effective and transparent communication and disclosure protocols
with community representatives are conducted. Public interest
responsibilities are not satisfied where it is clear that resource
development decisions have not been subjected to strong
community engagement protocols. Public interest in the social,
economic and environmental impacts of resource development
must be evaluated through connection, disclosure, engagement
and integration.9
The article is divided into five parts. Following the
introduction, Part two evaluates the operational deficiencies
associated with public resource frameworks in the context of an
expanding onshore energy landscape. The public resource
framework in Australia is based upon the largely unexamined
fragmentation between surface ownership and sub-surface
7. James L. Huffman, Public Land Management in an Age of Deregulation
and Privatization, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 29, 30 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 29-31 (discussing the problems connected with the public and
private divide within public resource frameworks, noting that in order to
maximize net social benefit within a public resource framework, more attention
must be paid to the fundamental choice between public and private control); see
also James K. Boyce, From Natural Resources to Natural Assets, in NATURAL
ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP 7 (James K. Boyce & Barry
G. Shelley eds., 2003).
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resources.10 This ownership disaggregation has generated a
number of schisms that have not been effectively addressed by
either common law or statute.11 This part examines the
uncertainty, confusion and conflict generated by this
fragmentation. It argues that these difficulties alter the
underlying public interest responsibilities held by the state. Public
interest within an ownership framework divided by unclear
common law and statutory boundaries depends upon the
implementation of improved governance that articulates public
and private domains and clarifies how communities connect and
engage with these domains.12
Part three examines two core social obligation doctrines that
reinforce the importance of broad responsive public interest
obligations. The first is the public trust doctrine and the second is
the doctrine of propriety and the associated jurisprudence of land
ethics.
The public trust doctrine imposes trust obligations on the state
over public natural resources and in so doing, ensures ongoing
state supervision of those resources.13 This part argues that the
public trust doctrine should either by applied in Australia or, its
core tenets should influence a stronger development of public
10. See Boyce, supra note 9, at 24 (The author notes that in practice, despite
the potency of landowner control, property rights are neither fully specified or
immutable. Thus, as societies change, so does the way in which they define and
allocate property.).
11. Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change and the Coal Bed
Methane Conflict in Montana and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCE J. 409, 414 (2005)
(noting that land disputes are an issue for both public and private resource
frameworks because to the frustration of landowners, mineral rights under both
frameworks will generally take precedence over surface rights.); see generally
Pamela O’Connor, Sharon A. Christensen, William D. Duncan, & Angela Phillips,
Regulation of Land Access for Resource Development: A Coal Seam Gas Case
Study from Queensland, 21(2) AUSTL. PROP. L.J. 110 (discussing the issue in the
public resource framework noting some of the difficulties connected with private
land access agreements which landholders and third parties enter into).
12. See Eric Freyfogle, Goodbye to the Public-Private Divide, 36 ENVTL. L. 7,
23 (2006) (arguing that the future is likely to see new and innovative ways in
which the public interest in land will be identified and protected.).
13. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property:
The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2010); see also
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (holding that
“the core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to
exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the
state and the land underlying those waters”).
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interest duties in order to promote a more rigorous integration of
community engagement protocols. The irreducible core of the
public trust doctrine is posited on the assumption that property
rights need to be responsive to evolving social and environmental
concerns, and therefore must adapt to suit the needs of a changing
community.14 Public resource ownership generates strong
communitarian responsibilities and should be exercised in a
manner that is consistent with broader social welfare objectives. 15
Land and natural resources are a component of an interconnected
habitat, which means ownership, should not be treated as an
autonomous entitlement. As outlined by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Just v. Marinette County, an owner of land has “no
absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as [to] use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others.”16 The public trust doctrine uses trust duties to encourage
the state to exercise their trust responsibilities by reference to the
correlative entitlements of the community of life that exists around
them.17 These principles have, in turn, encouraged an ecological
reconstruction of ownership norms.18
The doctrine of propriety and the jurisprudence of land ethics
are established social obligation principles that seek to impose
stronger social responsibilities upon land and resource owners. The

14. The most significant public trust decision in the United States was
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see Joseph L. Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970) (describing Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois as the most celebrated case in American public trust law);
see also Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 412 (1987)
(examining the legal rules that limit the power of the legislature to dispose of
public property.)
15. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (noting that resource ownership attracts variable).
16. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1968).
17. See Sax, supra note 14, at 473 (noting that the public trust doctrine is
one of the only legal concepts available in America which has the breadth and
substantive content to allow it to respond to community concerns regarding
natural resource management); see also Jennifer A. Kreder, The Public Trust, U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1425, 1446 (2016) (noting that the public trust is a trust for the
benefit of the people and public good rather than a prerogative for the advantage
of the government or the benefit of private individuals).
18. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 631, 650 (1996).
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doctrine of propriety builds upon the core Aristotelian notion that
the human being is a social and political animal and cannot be selfsufficient when functioning from a purely individualistic
perspective.19 Land ethics are a body of ethical premises relevant
to the ownership of land.20 The core assumption is that the
decisions landowners make require greater collaborative input
from the community in which the land exists because land is an
integral part of our habitat. Land ethics provide a normative
framework that encompasses the value of personhood and the
important goal of enhanced social welfare.21 Ownership
frameworks need to be informed by principles of propriety and
public good because they focus upon social relations rather than
pure market value giving them greater normative appeal.22
Part four of the article examines the growing importance of
social licensing protocols in the assessment and approval of
onshore resource titles. It argues that this trend provides formal
acknowledgement from industry that community engagement
protocols have become public interest responsibilities.23 The social
license to operate is an important device for industries operating
within the onshore resource sector as so many projects increasingly
depend upon community approval in order to function without
disruption. Social licensing mirrors the legal licensing process from

19. This concept is grounded in the jurisprudence known as ‘virtue ethics,’
which adopts an ethical perspective that seeks to emphasis virtues or moral
character in contradistinction to duties, rules or the consequences of actions. As
outlined by Rosalind Hursthouse, “[a] utilitarian will point to the fact that the
consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontolotist to the fact that,
in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as ‘Do
unto others as you would be done by’ and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping
the person would be charitable or benevolent.” See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS 1 (Oxford University Press ed., 1999); see also RICHARD KRAUT,
ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 15-54 (1989) (discussing the Aristotelian
perspective).
20. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 855-58
(2009) (arguing that virtue ethics offers a more effective approach to land-use
policy than economics because it has the capacity to take account of
incommensurable values).
21. Id. at 863.
22. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1035 (2009).
23. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1017, 1023 (2011) (noting that social obligation theorists argue that property
owners are both right and duty-holders).
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a communitarian perspective, confirming that resource
development is socially acceptable to the community in which it
operates.24 In this respect, social licencing operates as an auxiliary,
non-mandatory process. In many ways however, social licensing
has become more significant for industries operating in this sector
because it improves the reputational legitimacy of the industry.25
This part examines recent examples of social licensing to illustrate
how community engagement has influenced corporate social
strategies.
II. PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP
A. Public and Private Ownership Models
Land and natural resources are privy to ownership under
either public or private ownership frameworks. The adoption of one
or other of these ownership regimes for the management and
exploitation of land and natural resources is largely a consequence
of history and legislative context.26 It is also, inevitably, the
consequence of market efficiencies.27 The public ownership of subsurface natural resources is formally justified on the grounds that
it provides governments with economic benefits that may be
distributed for community benefit.28 On this basis, the Australia
public resource framework assumes that whilst land may be
subject to public or private ownership, the natural resources
residing within the land are owned by the state and this
24. See generally Jen Schneider, Barriers to Engagement: Why it is Time for
Oil and Gas to Get Serious about Public Communication, OIL AND GAS FACILITIES:
CULTURAL MATTERS (Apr. 2013), https://www.academia.edu/3291942/Barriers_to_
Engagement_Why_it_is_Time_for_Oil_and_Gas_to_Get_Serious_about_Public_C
ommunication [https://perma.cc/3US7-YHHR].
25. See Don C. Smith & Jessica M. Richards, Social License to Operate:
Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry, 1(2) OIL
& GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 81 (2015).
26. Id.
27. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 350 (1967) (where the author argues that property
regimes will inevitably seek reallocation towards the most efficient system).
28. This market based efficiency response to natural resource management
has been rejected by environmental ethicists; see, e.g., Mark Sagoff, On Preserving
the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 225 (1974) (noting that realistically
there is no economic or even utilitarian rationale available for preserving the
natural environment).
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entitlement is formalized through the implementation of explicit
statutory vesting provisions.29 Private landowners in a public
resource framework retain common law entitlements to the surface
estate. Public resources are conceptually disaggregated from the
bundle of rights that make up the land estate despite corporeal
integration.30
This framework has historical roots in the regalian system,
whereby the minerals existing within the ground were assumed to
belong to the king as the head of the state because this was for the
greatest advantage of society.31 In a modern context, these
historical assumptions form strong efficiency and management
rationales.32 The postulation is that valuable sub-surface
resources should be properly and strategically managed by the
state to ensure that the economic benefits of commercial
exploitation are proportionately distributed to all members of the
public.33
Theoretically,
revenue
generated
by
the
commercialization of sub-surface resources is re-injected back into
29. Public resource ownership is operational in all states and territories in
Australia. See generally Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights in
Oil and Gas Under Domanial Regimes, in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES 115, 118 (Aileen McHarg et. al. eds., 2010) (discussing the
operational distinctions of private and public resource frameworks).
30. SAMANTHA HEPBURN, MINING AND ENERGY LAW IN AUSTRALIA 11 (2015)
(noting that the public resource framework depends upon the fragmentation of
land and resource ownership despite their physical coalescence, through
legislative intervention.).
31. The term “regalian” refers to the right that the entire State, represented
by the King, reserves to itself to dispose of the ownership of the underground as
if it were public property, independent of the private property of the land which
contains it and to do so for the benefit of society. See Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra
note 29, at 120.
32. PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 29, at 12
(noting that ownership arrangements that separate land from mineral resources
are good for state planning and administration but lay the foundation for conflict
between public and private domains); see also Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond
Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through
Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 199, 209 (2013) (citing Emeka
Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence as a Major Gas
Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 440
(2009)) (arguing that the main rationalization for public ownership of natural
resources is that resources should be considered ‘public property’ to ensure that
they are conserved and managed for the welfare of all citizens).
33. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642
(1980) (arguing that the efficiency norm is oblique and largely impractical because
its success depends upon large informational input).
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the community thereby improving public protection.34 This
rationale overlooks broader social values because, as
environmental ethicists have argued, economic analysis tends to
make efficiency our primary goal as it is based upon the
assumption that efficiency corresponds with market preference.35
A private resource framework is not disaggregated in this way.
Ownership of the land and the resource are treated as a cohesive
totality unless and until the landowner decides to sever the
resource and create a mineral estate.36 Any such decision will
depend upon individual landowner preference and any unitization
obligations.37 The natural resources residing within the sub-strata
of the land continue to be vested in the landowner and, subject to
the rule of capture and any relevant statutory governance, the
decision to exploit the resources resides with the private owner
unless and until the lands are publically acquired.38
The public and private ownership frameworks are sourced in
two fundamentally different theories. Private resource ownership
is grounded in the theory of accession, which assumes that the
surface estate and the subsoil exist as a single cohesive ownership
unit because, in accordance with natural law, the two are
inherently indivisible.39 The theory of accession is encapsulated
34. The classic argument is that public goods must be managed by the state
because private producers would not have an incentive to manage them efficiently
and in accordance with public interest; see Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Customs, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
711, 717-19 (1986).
35. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, Public Interest in Private Land, in THE LAND WE
SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003).
36. See BARLOW BURKE & ROBERT BECK, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF
MINING: MINERALS AND ENERGY 59 (2010).
37. See Wieland, supra note 32, at 206. Within a private ownership
framework it is up to landowners to decide whether to exploit the resource and
this means that it is possible for different landowners to diverge in land use
preference. Unitization may occur where multiple owners of mineral rights to an
oil or gas field are subject to contractual obligations to minimize redundant
drilling and extraction processes. See Gary D. Libecapp & Steven N. Wiggins,
Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 87-89 (1984).
38. Boyce, supra note 9, at 25.
39. See Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM.
L. REV. 103, 103 (1922) (where the author outlines the different categories of
accession which include that of ‘confusion’ or ‘commixture,’ which amounts to the
intermixing of two similar things which cannot be distinguished); see also T. T.
Clarke, The Law of Accession, 14 J. JURIS. 165 (1870) (noting that accession
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within the ad coelum maxim, a common law principle that assumes
that the owner of land retains rights to the minerals and resources
in the sub-strata where those minerals are inextricably connected
to the sub-strata.40 The essential rationale of the ad coelum maxim
is that physical connectivity denotes ownership. Consequently, the
central design feature of the private resource framework is that
private landowners capture all ‘increments in value that are
prominently connected with the owned asset.’41
The public resource framework is grounded in the theory of
separation.42 The theory of separation assumes that a surface
estate is inherently divisible from the subsoil, and therefore
minerals and hydrocarbons residing within the subsoil may be
disaggregated from that sub-stratum.43 In most public resource
frameworks the statutory disaggregation occurs via explicit
statutory vesting provisions. The vesting provisions allow minerals
and hydrocarbons to be exploited directly by the state, and this in
turn, allows the state to issue concessions to third parties. Where
a concession is issued, and a third party acquires a resource title,
ownership in the resource will generally remain with the state
until extraction and subsequent transfer to a third party
purchaser.44

necessarily arises where the union of two things is so intimate that the one
becomes a mere constituent part of the other, and its individuality is destroyed).
40. For a discussion of the ad coelum principle, see generally Owen L.
Anderson, Lord Coke, The Restatement, and Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6
TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203 (2011) (noting that ad coelum maxims assert
that the surface owner retains ownership of all sub-surface strata down to the
center of the earth. This has, however, been qualified and the author notes that
United States courts have universally rejected a strict adherence to the ad coelum
principle preferring to base recovery on proof of actual and substantial harm.).
41. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 459, 477-78 (2009) (arguing that prominent connection is “hard-wired
in the psychology of human perception” so that there are “strong psychological
forces that equate physical connectedness with ownership”).
42. Boyce, supra note 9.
43. Id.; see also Nicholas J. Campbell, Jr., Principles of Mineral Ownership
in the Civil Law and Common Law Systems, 31 TUL. L. REV. 303, 310 (1956)
(noting that state ownership of minerals is more prevalent in civil law countries).
44. For example, the regulation of minerals and hydro-carbons in the public
resource system in Australia where legislative provisions explicitly state that
ownership of the resource remains with the state until transfer. See, e.g., Mineral
Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 s 11(2) (Austl.) (setting out that
minerals that are separated from the land remain the property of the state).
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B. Disaggregation of Resources from Land
The bifurcation of land and resource ownership within a public
resource framework has generated strong delineational tensions
particularly where surface estate activities conflict with the
resource extraction processes.45 The blurred nature of the
ownership interface means that the division between the control
rights held by the landowner (a common law ownership concept)
and the control rights held by the resource owner (a statutory
ownership concept) are indeterminate. This has generated
inevitable legal and conceptual collisions.46
This collision is particularly manifest in Australia in the vexed
issue of land access for holders of onshore resource titles seeking
access to sub-surface resources within privately owned land. The
prevailing assumption is that the private landowner may preclude
access to the public resource titleholder.47 This assumption is not
legislatively supported, and, further, is fundamentally
inconsistent with public interest imperatives that depend upon the
efficient exploitation of resources for the benefit of the community
as a whole.
Formally, the problem is a consequence of the unclear wording
in the vesting provisions. The nature of the state’s interest in the
resource, and its connection with any underlying radical title to the
land, is not defined, meaning that the entitlements of the private

45. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J.
1163, 1173 (1999) (discussing the importance of boundaries in private ownership
and noting that boundary rules are intrinsic, constitutive elements of wellfunctioning private property regimes that seek to limit spatial fragmentation
through direct and indirect mechanisms); see also Hanoch Dagan & Michael A.
Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
46. See generally Bobbier Johnson, Coalbed Methane Ownership Rights in
Wyoming, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 46 (2004) (discussing the problem
of individual entitlements in the context of overlapping resources in coalbed
methane sites).
47. See JULIAN BODENMANN, MATTHEW CAMERON, KATHRYN O’HARE & EMMA
ROSE-SOLOMAN, RESEARCH NOTE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY INTO THE RIGHTS OF
LANDHOLDERS TO PREVENT ACCESS TO LAND BY MINING COMPANIES 44 (2012),
http://www.law.uq.edu.au/documents/pro-bonocentre/publications/Research-note
-comparative-study-landholders-rights-July-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT3G-4P
5K] (noting that none of the jurisdictions in Australia afford the landholder a
general power of veto over land access).
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landowners, particularly any right to veto access, is unclear.48
Statutory property rights can arise through the validation of a preconceived entitlement or through the creation of new property with
unknown internal configuration.49 The vesting provisions make no
attempt to explain how the interest has arisen. Thus, the right is
assumed to pre-exist the implementation of the vesting provision.
This is further complicated by the fact that prior to the
implementation of the vesting provisions, the resource had no preexistence because it was subject to the common law doctrine of
accession.50
This delineational uncertainty raises deeper structural
concerns about the articulation and distribution of public interest
responsibilities. All ownership frameworks must be predicated
upon the existence and enforcement of a set of rules that articulate
and define the scope and boundary of entitlements. This is
particularly crucial in a public resource framework where public
and private interests intermingle.51 Property rights in natural
resources cannot simply emerge particularly, as Ostrom has noted,
in complex overlapping environments.52
Boundary rules are important because they prevent the overaccumulation of overlapping rights in a commons resource as well

48. See Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513
(Austl.) (discussing the connection between radical title and issued resource
titles).
49. See Mathew Storey, Not of this Earth: The Extraterrestrial Nature of
Statutory Property in the 21st Century, 25 AUSTL. RESOURCES & ENERGY L.J. 51,
54 (2006) (discussing the different ways of articulating the scope and nature of
statutory property); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964) (describing government discretion within regulatory frameworks as an
important new form of property).
50. See Merrill, supra note 41, at 467 (discussing the doctrine of accession
and noting that ad coelum is a sub-category of the doctrine of accession).
51. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853,
1870-71 (2012) (noting that the collection of norms and doctrinal tools governing
conflict vary but the more social the institution, the greater the collective input);
see also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 232-37 (2011)
(arguing that property frameworks need to facilitate greater cooperation amongst
intersecting interests).
52. See Elinor Ostrom, Private and Common Property Rights, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 334 (2000), http://reference.findlaw.com/
lawandeconomics/2000-private-and-common-property-rights.pdf [https://perma.
cc/DE5M-SZED] (noting that “rules and rulers are required to establish, monitor
and enforce a property system”).
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as the over-accumulation of rights of exclusion in an anti-commons
environment.53 The absence of boundary rules generates distrust
and concern. This, in turn, exacerbates conflict resulting in
stakeholders being forced to resort to private treaty. This
inevitably externalises broader community members from private
resource arrangements and diminishes public confidence in the
state management processes. Ownership frameworks for natural
resources must be explicable and coherent as they play a crucial
role in advancing the normative vision of how society and the policy
that governs it should be structured.54
C. Public Interest Obligations
Public resource frameworks aim to implement an optimal
interactive framework between humans and natural resources via
the intermediary of the state.55 The state, as de jure owner of the
commons resource, must ensure that in exercising ownership
entitlements in public resources, it acts in a manner that
maximises public interest.56 This is an onerous responsibility,
particularly given the dramatic changes occurring within the
onshore resource landscape. The increased connectivity between
ownership norms, ecological imperatives and market forces has
fundamentally shifted public interest beyond economic
imperatives.57 Neo-classical efficiency rationales no longer
adequately capture the inherent value of the human-nature

53. See Heller, supra note 45, at 1194; see also Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) (outlining the broad anti-commons framework).
54. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997).
55. Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 45, at 555-59 (noting that ownership
frameworks reflect an outdated repertoire of the categories of human interaction).
56. See Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 29, at 118; see also Ostrom, supra
note 52, at 335-37 (differentiating between open access resource ownership and
common resource ownership and noting that de jure government property regimes
often lack resources to monitor effective usage, particularly in developing
countries).
57. See Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within
Nature’s Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 938 (2000) (outlining the connectivity
between economics and individualism in ownership norms).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4

14

2017]

PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP

393

continuum.58 A monistic view of public interest ignores social and
environmental considerations that transcend market economics.
In The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin argued that open
access by all members of the community would encourage over
consumption and degradation of common resources.59 Hardin
argued that the commons locks people into a system that compels
them to increase in a world that is limited because “ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”60
This is further encapsulated in the Aristotelian notion, “that which
is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon
it.”61
One of the difficulties with articulating a broader
conceptualization of public interest lies in the deeply entrenched
notion that public resources must be controlled and the conferral
of autonomy and entitlement is, in itself, a public benefit. Hardin
argued that controlled ownership of commons resources presents a
more effective management option for commons resources because
it combats the overconsumption and collective degradation which
can flow from an open access regime where unmitigated selfinterest reigns.62 Hardin did not consider in any detail how private
ownership regimes might themselves degrade common resources.

58. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation,
and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 588 (2004)
(arguing that questions of what we want in the context of climate change “depend
not on cost-benefit balancing, but rather on the will of the global community to
conceive of and to realize a transformation of culture toward some shared ideal”).
59. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SX7F-LR5E] (arguing that avoiding the tragedy of overexploitation of the
commons means that the community must willingly surrender the unfettered
“freedom” that characterizes common ownership).
60. Id. at 1244.
61. Aristotle, Discussion of Ideal States, in THE POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION
OF ATHENS, BOOK II, at 33 (Stephen Everson ed., 2d ed. 1996).
62. See Hardin, supra note 58; see also James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the
Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 329-30 (1992) (explaining
Terry Anderson and Donald Leal’s argument that it is wiser to harness self
interest than to preach against it, and that social institutions need to provide
constructive incentives and this is exactly what private property and free markets
offer); Martin Froněk, The Tragedy of the Commons: Four Decades Later, 11
COMMON L. REV. 16, 18 (2010) (noting that private rights encourage owners to
care for and preserve the resource); Demsetz, supra note 27, at 348.

15

394

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

Overuse by private entities licensed by the state has, in the
absence of effective oversight, produced degradation and
overconsumption. The consequences have been particularly dire
where it involves the destruction or diminution of crucial commons
resources.63
For example, unconventional gas production has the capacity
to significantly deplete or contaminate groundwater aquifers
because large volumes of sub-surface water may be removed
during the extraction process. This may cause irreversible damage
to the water tables.64 Groundwater is a crucial source of water in
an age when surface supply of water has become less reliable and
predictable. Groundwater is also a particularly important source
of supply in times of drought. Detailed research about the state of
groundwater supplies is yet to be carried out because of the cost
and complexity associated with monitoring large aquifer systems.
Recent studies have, however, revealed that groundwater systems
across the globe are experiencing significant stress, with the largescale depletion apparent in the Canning Basin in Australia being
directly linked to onshore mining activities in the region.65
Many subsequent property theorists have critiqued Hardin’s
essay. Heller argued that strong exclusionary rights in parcelized
land might actually lead to an unproductive ‘anti-commons’
tragedy.66 The anti-commons represent the inverse of the open-

63. See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of CommonLaw Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990); see also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen
Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 267 (1996) (arguing that Anglo-American legal
principles recognized both private property rights and public rights, particularly
in resources that are not easily turned into private property, and that takings law
is essentially an effort to balance public and private rights as they evolve over
time).
64. See M. Alexander Pearl, The Tragedy of the Vital Commons, 45 ENVTL. L.
1021, 1053 (2015) (arguing that the restoration of the “vital commons” is difficult
and exhaustion is extremely dire due to the essential nature of the resource,
“[o]veruse leading to depletion is the epitome of apocalypse”).
65. Two University of California, Irvine studies indicate that a third of the
groundwater basins across the globe are in distress. See Alexandra S. Richey et
al., Quantifying Renewable Groundwater Stress with GRACE, 51 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 5217, 5228 (2015); Alexandra S. Richey et al., l , Uncertainty in
Global Groundwater Storage Estimates in a Total Groundwater Stress
Framework, 51 WATER RESOURCE RES. 5198 (2015).
66. See Heller, supra note 53, at 624 (arguing that with too many owners of
property fragments, resources become prone to waste either through overuse in a
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access problem in that conferral of multiple rights of exclusion can
actually result in land and resources being utilized inefficiently.67
In an anti-commons tragedy, “too many individuals have rights of
exclusion over” a specified piece of property, and this excessive
fragmentation generates widespread under-utilization of valuable
resources.68 Private owners are encouraged to hold out for high
prices and this can often mean valuable resources go unused.69 It
can also produce high transaction costs resulting in welfareenhancing improvements being overlooked.70
Carol Rose argued that open access utilisation of commons
resources is not always tragic, particularly where it reveals a
common benefit. She noted that the increased utilisation of a
common resource could, in some situations, stimulate greater
investment and return.71 Elinor Ostrom argued that users of the
commons could overcome the ‘tragedy’ scenario connected with the
overconsumption and degradation of commons resources where
well-structured governance and management regimes have been
implemented.72
Predicting behaviour within a commons framework is difficult
given the infinite contextual and social variations that can exist.73
The commons is, necessarily, a public domain as it contains a

commons or underuse in an anti-commons. Well-functioning property regimes
prevent such waste by drawing boundaries that constrain owner’s choices about
fragmentation).
67. Inefficiency in this context refers in the pure sense to the Pareto
principle. A situation is Pareto ‘optimal’ or Pareto ‘efficient’ if there is no
alternative which would constitute a Pareto ‘improvement.’ Gerard Debreu,
Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 588, 588
(1954).
68. Heller, supra note 53, at 677.
69. For further discussion on the anti-commons, see Heller, supra note 53, at
633-640. See also Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 921 (2003).
70. See Heller, supra note 53, at 688.
71. See Rose, supra note 34, at 768.
72. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88-102 (1990) (providing a list of different
circumstances where such well-structured systems have worked effectively).
73. See generally E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-comedy of the Commons:
Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17
(2001) (noting that the complexity of commons resources and of human
interactions and reactions to those resources makes it difficult to predict commons
behavior).
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diverse array of natural and cultural resources, each of which have
multiple dimensions. The conferral of de jure ownership rights to
the state in commons resources must therefore be subject to broad,
evolving public interest responsibilities that transcend ownership
paradigms and connect to the comprehensive public management
obligations of the state.
These obligations have progressed significantly in the context
of natural resource ownership. There has been a clear
delineational shift away from the early preservationist perspective
of environmental legislation, which was directed at the actions of
governmental agencies, to more recent preventionist legislation,
directed at the actions of private individuals.74 Within this context,
the community has become more attuned to the obligation of the
state, as public resource owner, to manage common resources in
accordance with progressive social welfare issues.75
Public participation and community engagement protocols
have a much higher significance within this context.76 Community
engagement in this context has evolved into a strong public
interest responsibility. Determining which communities are
affected by resource development and how those communities feel
about the prospect of such development is increasingly crucial
because it provides important insight into social attitudes and
behaviour.77

74. Cf. Allan Kanner & Mary E. Zeigler, Understanding and Protecting
Natural Resources, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 119, 122 (2006) (noting that
there has been a shift from a ‘great places’ approach to natural resources to a
‘reclaiming’ approach).
75. See, e.g., Paul Rose, The Management of Public Natural Resource Wealth
22-25 (Ohio St. Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 191, 2013) (examining
governance of natural resource funds).
76. For a discussion on the importance of holistic ownership and community
engagement in unconventional gas expansion, see David E. Pierce, Carol Rose
Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir
Problems, 19 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2011) (arguing that individual
rights to oil and gas reservoirs, where many individuals possess similar rights
and duties, each impact the community and should be viewed as affirmative
correlative rights which more completely recognize private individuals rights,
particularly in regards to their “status as a member of the reservoir community”).
77. See David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects
of Social Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 366 (2003) (arguing that private
property should be framed, particularly in the context of public resources, as
spectrum metaphor for property entitlements and responsibilities).
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The state cannot make decisions that maximize social good if
it does not fully understand or appreciate the nature and texture
of the community, what its priorities are and the potential impact
of a public resource decision upon that community.78 The deeprooted notion that the public has no legitimate societal interest in
decisions made within the private ownership domain has no
relevance to public resources owned the by state. This is
particularly true given the potent issues that underpin
environmental management, ecological sustainability and biodiversity.79 Non-engagement with communitarian values and
perspectives disconnects common resources from their evolving
social and ecological macrocosm.80
D. The Onshore Resource Sector and Co-operative
Governance
Public resource systems need to be reconfigured to properly
support and facilitate a broader public interest imperative that
takes greater account of co-operative governance norms.81 The
state, as resource owner, must ensure that the public, as resource
users, are informed and connected. Co-operative governance
depends upon the facilitation of collaborative processes. In a public

78. Cf. Alexander, supra note 23 (presenting theories of property where
ownership comes with obligations of support towards the community); John
O’Neill, Property, Care and Environment, 19 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 695,
696 (2001) (noting that “[c]are for particular places which embody the life of a
community [. . .] is often expressed through resistance to liberal property rights”).
79. Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (noting that “understanding the nature of sustenance and
biodiversity calls for a rethinking of our assumptions about landownership”).
80. Cf. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 780 (2002) (arguing that one of the
most serious flaws in the bundle of rights metaphor lies in the treatment of
individual parcels of land as “free standing and unrelated to other bundles or the
larger community”).
81. For a discussion on the nature and importance of co-operative governance
norms, see John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption,
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1037
(2013) (noting that the adoption of bans may be the product of political reaction
and reflective of the fact that communities may not have access to best practices
in law and/or science, which may be overcome by state agencies investing time
and money in creating a regulatory framework that implements a co-operative
state-local approach to controlling local impacts and promoting regional
interests).
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resource framework, collaboration is incentivized through the
implementation of normative behavioural standards that facilitate
a broader dialogue between public policy networks, community
stakeholders and representatives before, during, and after the
resource development process.82 This is particularly imperative in
the onshore resource sector where competition for public resources
has generated significant conflict, which has been exacerbated by
structural ambiguities.
The recent developments in the state of Victoria, Australia,
provide an interesting case study and are illustrative of the
difficulties facing a public resource framework with ineffectual
collaborative governance. In August 2016, the Victorian state
government announced a permanent ban on all onshore
unconventional gas development as well as an extension of the
existing moratorium on conventional onshore gas development
until 2020.83 A moratorium had been in place since 2012 over all
conventional and unconventional onshore gas development,
including all approvals for fracking, exploration, drilling activities
and the use of chemicals in fracking.84 Moratoriums and bans have
been utilized in the United States, and whilst many have been long
lasting, they are provisional in nature, signaling the need for
substantive change in governance.85
82. This is broadly consistent with what is known as a reflexive law model
where decision-making processes can involve a range of stakeholders including
government, industry and civic stakeholders who cooperatively develop and
implement performance based solutions. See generally Sanford E. Gaines,
Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (2003).
83. Victoria Bans Fracking to Protect Farmers, VICTORIA (Aug. 2016),
http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victoria-bans-fracking-to-protect-farmers/ [https://
perma.cc/QJ5S-FBBJ].
84. Id. The ban has was passed and incorporated in legislation in March
2017. It is now set out in the Mineral Resources Sustainable Development Act 1992
(Vic) ss 8(A) and 8(D) (Austl.), and the Petroleum Act 1998 (Vic), s 16(A) (Austl.).
85. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten & Nicholas Kusnetz, New York Passes
Temporary Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 4, 2010),
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-senate-passes-temporary-ban-onhydraulic-fracturing [https://perma.cc/LUG4-XSLB] (discussing the temporary
moratorium passed in New York banning hydraulic fracturing until May 2011
with the aim of giving the legislature more time to investigate the associated
environmental impacts); Joe Smydo, City OKs Ban on Gas Drilling, PITT. POST
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.uppermon.org/news/Pgh-Alleg/PPG-PGH_
Drilling_Ban-17Nov10.html [https://perma.cc/E4T4-BVHV] (discussing the 2010
ban by the city council of Pittsburgh on natural gas drilling within the city limits).
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The permanent ban in Victoria followed the findings of an
inquiry in 2015 into onshore unconventional gas development in
Victoria.86 These findings indicated a widespread failure by the
state government to develop effective community engagement
protocols involving a sufficient cross-section of community
representatives. The finding also revealed transparency failures
because communities have not been informed of relevant
information regarding chemicals and toxins used within hydraulic
fracturing processes. The non-disclosure of chemicals used in
hydraulic fracturing processes was found to be commonplace
within ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements, a practice that
was compounded by the absence of any legal obligation mandating
public disclosure of the types, concentrations or toxicity of any such
chemicals.87
The inquiry found that community concern regarding the
social and environmental impacts of onshore unconventional gas
was extensive and had not been dispelled. This concern was
apparent from the broad range of submissions received from a
cross-section of community stakeholders including farmers and
other landholders, environmental groups, land-care groups,
medical professionals, hydro-geologists, tourism operators, small
business owners, and local councils.88
For example, the submission received from a community group
describing themselves as the ‘Gasfield Free Seaspray’ in the Otway
region, an area renowned for agriculture and tourism, made it
clear that 98 per cent of those surveyed in the community did not
want gas fields in the Seaspray community or surrounding areas.89
Further, it asserted that the community had unilaterally declared
itself to be ‘gas field free’ on 28 July 2013, despite the absence of

86. PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA: ENV’T & PLANNING COMM., INQUIRY INTO
ONSHORE UNCONVENTIONAL GAS IN VICTORIA: FINAL REPORT (2015), http://www.
parliament.vic.gov.au/file_uploads/EPC_58-03_Text_WEB_BYPNWy4W.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49YR-MSSL] [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
87. Id. at 56
88. See, e.g., id. at app. (listing over 1600 submitters over a six month period);
id. at 66 (noting that since 2012 over 60 communities in Gippsland and Western
Victoria declared themselves ‘gas field free’ and formed local action groups);
Inquiry into Unconventional Gas in Victoria: Submissions, PARLIAMENT OF
VICTORIA: ENV’T & PLANNING COMM., http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/epc/article
/2636 [https://perma.cc/QH2P-PR6W].
89. PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 66.
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any government or industry engagement. The community
proceeded to mark the occasion with the formation of a human
sign, comprised of 650 people, spelling out the words ‘No Gas
Fields.’90
The eventual imposition by the state government of a
permanent ban on all onshore unconventional gas development
amounted to a failure of governance. The absence of cooperative
measures within the regulatory framework capable of properly
supporting the integration of deep-rooted community concerns
over the social and environmental impacts of unconventional gas
extraction combined with the absence of a clear ownership
interface between private land ownership and public resource
ownership were critical issues. The deficiencies generated
community distrust, anxiety and disengagement.
Whilst the ban alleviates the immediate environmental
concerns associated with unconventional gas extraction, it is not a
solution. The entire purpose of a ban or a moratorium is the
suspension of private activities in the interests of broader public
benefit. A ban does not provide resolution and indeed, its presence
is indicative of deeper social, economic and regulatory concerns
that require attention.91 The endpoint for a moratorium or ban is
therefore legal reform. This should include greater cooperative
governance between state and federal governments within a
federal framework because working together to achieve
comprehensive outcomes is the most effective way of addressing
entrenched social and environmental issues relevant to onshore
energy development.92 A ban should not act as a subterfuge or
impediment to the expedient implementation of regulatory
development that is consistent with progressive public interest
obligations—otherwise it is regressive.

90. Id.
91. See Bram Thompson, What Is a Moratorium?, 42 CAN. L. TIMES 761, 762
(1922) (“[a] [m]oratorium is simply a [l]aw to delay the exercise of some right
which in the absence of the Moratorium would be in complete operation.”).
92. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy
Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 153 (2016)
(arguing that improving coordination in energy governance depends upon further
changes being implemented to federalism models).
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III. SOCIAL OBLIGATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public resource framework in Australia has much to learn
from the public trust doctrine, which has been so influential in the
regulation and management of natural resources in the United
States. The doctrine has been profoundly important because it
imposes trust obligations upon state governments, and compels
them to take account of public values when making decisions that
impact vital natural resources within their ownership domain.93 In
this respect, the public trust doctrine functions in an anticipatory
mode,94 because its ultimate objective is to facilitate change in
social and governmental behavior. Whilst the public trust doctrine
has been criticized as illegitimately substituting informed
administrative discretion with informed judicial opinion,95 it
nevertheless remains a crucially important doctrine in terms of its
capacity to protect and manage some of the fundamental changes
occurring within natural resource domains. These changes are vast
and disruptive and include significant transitional alterations
connected with the deployment of carbon abatement strategies
that necessarily include the implementation of onshore renewable
energy projects and the expansion of conventional and
unconventional gas production. The changes are a product of
social, technological and environmental progression and
necessarily involve expanding public interest assessments. Within
93. See Sax, supra note 14, at 484 (where the author famously argues that
“certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their free
availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens . . . . [T]o protect those
rights, it is necessary to be especially wary lest any particular individual or group
acquire the power to control them.”). See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004); Alexandra B. Klass,
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Richard L. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
94. Timothy Patrick Brady, “But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:”
The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 621, 631 (1990).
95. Steven M. Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law:
Ineffective- and Undesirable- Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 457
(1982).
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this context, the public trust doctrine plays a vital role, monitoring
the progression of government activities.96
Historically, the public trust doctrine is a derivation of
common law and Roman civil law. The Institutes of Justinian
stated that, in accordance with the law of nature, “these things are
common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea.”97 The public acquired
usufructuary rights in these common resources through what was
known as res communis ownership, which the state protected. This
meant that the public held rights to fish in rivers and ports as well
as rights of passage and navigation in navigable rivers and the
sea.98
The public trust doctrine emerged in the United States in the
19th century through a series of seminal cases. In these cases, relief
was granted upon the basis that the state owned all the navigable
waterways and the land beneath those waterways as a trustee
under a public trust.99 The trust played an important role in this
context because it prevented the state from transferring public
land to private owners so as to preclude the public from the right
to use the waterways.100 As outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, where it was held that
the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, which the State
Government owned and had alienated for a railroad development,
were:

96. For example, the ability of the public to engage in commerce is an
established public interest that the public trust seeks to protect. See Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892). The application of the public trust to new
resources of environmental significance was discussed by Jordan M. Ellis, The
Sky’s the Limit: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to the Atmosphere, 86 TEMP.
L. REV. 807, 814 (2014) (noting that “[w]hen considering the reach of the public
trust doctrine, courts are guided by the present interests and values of society”).
97. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 158.2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans.,
1876).
98. The principle is derived from THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN which
characterizes certain types of property as ‘common to all’; see Patrick Deveney,
Title, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT
L.J. 13, 23 (1976).
99. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 466 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
100. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842); Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L 1 (1821).
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. . .held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference
of private parties. . .The trust devolving upon the State for the
public, and which can only be discharged by the management and
control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be
relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the State
for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein,
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.101

Subsequent decision applied the public trust principle to other
areas of natural resource governance and, in 1970, Joseph Sax
famously argued that the public trust doctrine had the potential to
apply to a wide range of areas “in which diffuse public interests
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and
immediate goals.”102 Sax argued that the protective focus of the
public trust gave it great functionality within a large range of
vulnerable natural resource areas.103
The primary utility of the doctrine lay in its capacity to ensure
that the state complied with strict trustee responsibilities when
managing common resources for the benefit of the public. The
public holds the beneficial title and can compel the state to comply
with trustee responsibilities. State Attorney Generals, as trustees,
may sue for any damages to natural resources held on public trust
by the state.104
To establish a claim for damages, a state Attorney General
must prove that the actions of the state amount to a breach of
trustee responsibility in that the action constitutes “an
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of trust
rights.”105 In some states natural resource damages may be
recovered for a breach relevant to any natural resource. In other

101. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53.
102. Sax, supra note 14, at 556.
103. Id.
104. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the
Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57, 59 (2005).
105. Id.
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states, however, recovery is restricted to natural resources actually
owned by the state.106
The state Attorney-General also has the power to bring a
parens patriae action, where recovery of natural resource damages
is sought on the basis of an injury to the sovereign or quasisovereign interests of the state and this includes injury to the
environment.107 The recent decision of the California Superior
Court in Environmental Law Foundation, et al. v. State Water
Resources Control Board, et al. is illustrative of the scope of the
action. In that case, the court held that the state had a “fiduciarylike” duty to consider the possible environmental impacts upon
navigable water following the pumping of nearby groundwater.108
The applicants argued that the depletion of groundwater decreased
flows in the river because the river was hydrologically connected to
the groundwater systems. This, in turn, harmed river fish
populations and had a deleterious effect upon navigability. The
court held that the diversion of groundwater was, in the
circumstances, harmful to public interests that were explicitly
protected by the public trust doctrine and this could generate
natural resource damages.109

106. Id. at 59 (citing State by Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59
(N.D. 1972); Commonwealth v. Agway Inc., 232 A.2d 69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
Both cases were referred to by EDWARD H. P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO
PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 53 (2001), explaining that the courts in both cases
held that state claims for natural resource damages due to loss of fish could not
succeed because the state did not own the fish).
107. See id. at 59; see also Carter H. Strickland, Jr., The Scope of Authority
of Natural Resource Trustees, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 318 (1995); Michael
McGrath, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy,
30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 449, 451 (2005) (noting the strong common law
responsibility of the state attorney-generals under the public trust doctrine to
protect natural resources within state boundaries).
108. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 2014 WL 8843074,
at 6 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. July 15, 2014); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (where it was held that the public
trust doctrine bestows on the state a positive duty to consider the impact of
government action on public trust resources. In practical terms this means that
the state must try to minimize or avoid harm to interests protected by the public
trust.).
109. See Envtl. Law Found., 2014 WL 8843074 at 8. This principle provides
governmental agencies enforcing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
a defense against a takings claim. See also Adam Bowling & Elizabeth Vissers,
The Public Trust Doctrine and its Groundwater Application in California, 18 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 468 (2015).
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The public trust doctrine has been articulated as a state
doctrine given its application to state owned natural resource
interests. In Alec L v. Jackson, the district court dismissed a claim
by six federal agencies which had allegedly violated their fiduciary
duty to preserve and protect the atmosphere as a commonly shared
public trust in accordance with the public trust doctrine.110 The
court held that the public trust doctrine was a matter of state
rather than federal law and consequently the court did not have
jurisdiction.111 Further, even if the public trust doctrine did apply
to federal constitutional law, the provisions of the Clean Air Act
displaced it.112 This was the explicit conclusion of the Supreme
Court in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, where it was
held that the environmental protection actions authorized by the
Clean Air Act precluded any federal common law right to seek
abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from carbon intensive
power plants.113
The non-application of the public trust doctrine to federal
agencies was recently revisited by the district court in Kelsey
Cascade Rose Julianana et al v. United States of America where
Judge Coffin indicated a preparedness to entertain a federal action
grounded in public trust principles.114 In that case, the plaintiffs
included a group of young people, aged 19 years or younger as well
as activist associations who argued they were beneficiaries of a
federal public trust which had been breached because they had
been harmed by government action and inaction in generating
carbon pollution and allowing fossil fuel exploitation.115 The
plaintiffs argued that the approval and promotion of fossil fuel
development, including exploration, extraction, production,

110. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Alec
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
111. Id. at 15 (where District Judge Wilkins concluded that the plaintiffs
have not raised a federal question to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under
§ 1331).
112. Id. at 16; see also the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (2012). The
act was first enacted in 1970 and was substantially amended in 1990. Evolution
of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolutionclean-air-act [https://perma.cc/Y2P5-NEM9] (last updated Jan. 3, 2017).
113. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011).
114. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-1517-TC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52940 (D. Or. 2016).
115. Id. at *4.
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transportation, importation, exportation and combustion resulted
in violations their fundamental constitutional rights to be free
from government actions that harm life, liberty and property.116
The defendant argued that the public trust doctrine is a
matter of state law and does not depend upon Federal
Constitutional law.117 Judge Coffin disagreed, holding that there
were constitutional parameters connected with the emission of
greenhouse gases from fossil fuel exploitation.118 He argued that:
. . .the intractability of the debates before Congress and state legislatures and the alleged valuing of short-term economic interest
despite the cost to human life, necessitates a need for the courts to
evaluate the constitutional parameters of the action or inaction
taken by the government. This is especially true when such harms
have an alleged disparate impact on a discrete class of society.119

He concluded that:
When combined with the EPA’s duty to protect the public health
from airborne pollutants and the government’s public trust duties
deeply ingrained in this country’s history, the allegations in the
complaint state, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a substantive due process claim.120

These cases reveal a deep-rooted consciousness of the
overarching relevance of the public trust doctrine in United States
constitutional jurisprudence.121 This has imbued the public trust
doctrine with a blend of both common law and constitutional
elements.122 The explicit obligation imposed on the government by
the public trust, to protect natural resources within its domain,
includes protection against the impact of onshore resource
development as well as protection against the broader impacts of

116. Id. at *5-8.
117. Id. at *25-28.
118. Id. at *16.
119. Id. at *17.
120. Id. at *39-40.
121. Id.
122. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425
(1989).
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the climate change crisis.123 This is because the public interest
responsibilities of the state government are encapsulated within
an explicit duty of loyalty that is owed towards the public
beneficiaries of the trust, to act in their interests when making
decisions that affect natural resources. The breadth of the public
trust doctrine in the United States has also encouraged significant
legislative developments, at both the state and federal level, in
areas that include environmental protection and natural resource
management.124
In Australia, there has been resistance to any application of
the public trust doctrine despite its clear utility within a public
resource framework.125 There have been a number of reported
instances where the courts have drawn upon the language of the
public trust doctrine to illustrate, largely in a metaphorical sense,
the special responsibilities of the state towards the public
resources it owns or controls, however no formal adoption has
occurred.126

123. Courtney Lords, Protection of Public Trust Assets: Trustees’ Duty of
Loyalty in the Context of Modern American Politics, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 519,
524 (2008) (noting that the sovereign trustees must act to defend the trust against
injury, and this duty links the doctrine to the climate change crisis).
124. It has been argued that the implementation of this legislation has
resulted in the public trust doctrine having outlived its utility. See Lazarus, supra
note 93, at 633 (arguing that trends in legislative development indicate that the
public trust doctrine lacks the utility it previously had and it now “obscures
analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking natural
resources law”).
125. The prospect of applying the public trust in Australia was examined by
Tim Bonyhady, A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia, 12 ENVTL. & PLAN.
L.J. 329 (1995); P. Stein, Ethical Issues in Land-use Planning and the Public
Trust, 12 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J 13, 593-601 (1996) (the author argued that the
whilst the public trust has had little influence on the evolution of environmental
law in Australia, two nineteenth century cases reveal that the trust is
nevertheless deeply embedded in Australian law). See also Tim Bonyhady, An
Australian Public Trust, in ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND POLICY: STILL SETTLING
AUSTRALIA 258-72 (Stephen Dovers, ed., 2000); GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 41-43 (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed. 2010).
126. See, e.g., Willoughby City Council v Minister for the Env’t (1989) 78
LGERA 19, 34 (Austl.) (noting that “[N]ational parks are held by the State in trust
for the enjoyment and benefit of its citizens, including future generations”). A
public trust argument was raised in Upper Mooki Landcare Inc v Shenhua
Watermark Coal Pty Ltd & Minister for Planning (2016) NSWLEC 6, 152 (Austl.),
where the applicant argued that the principles of ecological sustainable
development are informed by the public trust, however the argument was rejected
on the grounds that a duty to consider an application “affirmatively,
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This is unfortunate given the clear value such a doctrine would
bring to an ownership framework where public interest is crucial
because sub-surface resources have been vested in the state. Two
primary reasons have been put forward for its rejection. In the first
place, it has been argued that the existence of the public trust may
interfere with the sovereign powers of the Crown as the ultimate
owner of all land within a feudal hierarchy. As a trustee under a
public trust, the state must act in the interests of the public and it
has been suggested that the application of such a rigorous fiduciary
obligation may conflict with the effective exercise of sovereign
constitutional power.127 Secondly, it has been argued that the
fiduciary responsibilities generated by the public trust are
inconsistent with statutory powers and therefore interfere with the
robust adaptability of established judicial review principles.128
These objections are increasingly difficult to justify within a
changing onshore resource context. It has been suggested that any
application of the public trust principle within Australia would
require a fundamental “reconceptualization of the importance of
such rights in our jurisprudence. . .”129 The dramatic changes to
the onshore energy landscape arguably justify such revision
because the rights of the public, as the ultimate beneficiaries of
natural resources, require strong, institutional protection. It is
crucial to ensure that the state exercises power over vested natural
resources in accordance with strict public interest responsibilities.
Monitoring the shifting and somewhat amorphous nature of these
public responsibilities would be more appropriately conduct
through the application of equitable responsibilities under a trust

fundamentally and properly” effectively amounted to a merits review rather than
a judicial review.
127. See Tito v. Waddell (No. 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129 (Eng.) (where the court
argued that the Crown had acted in breach of trust and fiduciary obligations owed
to them regarding phosphate mining royalties that had been paid into ‘trust
funds’ for the indigenous communities. Megarry V-C held that this created not a
true trust but rather a ‘higher form’ trust because it involved a relationship with
the Crown. The ‘higher form’ trust was more an emanation of governmental
obligation than specific fiduciary responsibility.). For further discussion, see
Stephen Gray, Holding the Government to Account: The ‘Stolen Wages’ Issue,
Fiduciary Duty and Trust Law, 32 MELB. U.L.R. 115 (2008).
128. See Paul Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, 38 FED. L. REV. 335,
340 (2010) (the author argues that judicial review operates in a distinct manner
to the discretionary dimensions of the fiduciary power).
129. Id. at 345.
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mechanism. Indeed, the overriding importance of the public trust
doctrine has already been recognized in the context of coastal
waters, where the threat of coastal recession due to extreme
weather events and sea level rises has prompted calls for its
prompt implementation.130
The equitable duties of the government, as public trustee,
ensure consideration is given to the interests of the public as a
whole, because the public is the ultimate owner. The significance
of the public trust, like the private trust, lies in the fact that the
ownership held by the trustee is not absolute. Trustees must look
after the trust assets vested within them so that they are protected
against loss and so that the interests of existing and future
beneficiaries are managed. The duty of loyalty also requires
governments to communicate and disclose to public beneficiaries
all relevant information regarding natural resource management
and exploitation.131 Strong transparency and accountability
requirements are consistent with the emerging importance of
community engagement protocols.132 The public trust doctrine
would require all documents connected to decisions made
regarding public resources to be publicly accessible. All such
documents are trust documents but it would not include
information relevant to the exercise of administrative discretion.
This is consistent with the private law principle that information
relevant to the exercise of discretion is not a trust document.133
The obligation to communicate and disclose would significantly
enhance the capacity of the state to satisfy public interest

130. See generally Bruce Thom, Climate Change, Coastal Hazards and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 8 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 21 (2012).
131. Cf. 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 356 (2005).
132. The constitutional framework in Australia imposes a system of
representative government however the pattern of governmental organizations
which it ordains has resulted in the creation of power relationships, institutional
arrangements and practices and policy processes which have made the Australian
public vulnerable. See the discussion by P. Finn, Public Trust and Public
Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224, 227 (1994).
133. In re Londonderry’s Settlement, [1964] 3 All ER 6 (Eng.); see Marigold
Pty Ltd v Belswan (Mandurah) Pty Ltd (2001) 209 WASC 23 (Austl.) (“[T]he right
of a beneficiary to inspect trust documents, whether founded on proprietary right
or fiduciary duty is not unqualified. Confidentiality or privilege are circumstances
in which a discretion to refuse inspection may arise.”).
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obligations towards communities impacted by resource
development.134
Further, where trust principles are breached, there is
significant scope for awarding relief. The state, as public trustee,
would act to defend the trust assets against injury and, where
damage occurs, the state would be obliged to restore the trust
assets.135 The availability and scope of relief for the breach of a
public trust duty would provide a stronger incentive for a broader
and more rigorous protection of vested natural resource assets by
the state as well as stronger adherence to community engagement
processes.
The public trust doctrine is an important transitional tool
because of its ability to provide institutional guidance and stability
as it actively seeks to protect reasonable expectations in the
relative stability of relationships from the destabilizing effects of
change.136 The integration of the public trust principle into
Australian jurisprudence would provide members of the public, as
beneficiaries under a broader public trust, with improved rights of
communication and disclosure. It would improve the capacity of
localized residents and stakeholders to engage in governmental
decisions regarding public trust assets that affect the community.
In this respect, adopting the public trust doctrine would facilitate
greater adherence to collaborative government norms. This would
be a constructive and positive development given the capacity of
state decisions to affect ecologies, biodiversity, climate change, food
security and at a macro level, principles of intergenerational
equity.137

134. See generally Chris Ballard & Glen Banks, Resource Wars: The
Anthropology of Mining, 32 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 287 (2003) (the authors
discuss the different forms of community engagement that have emerged within
mining communities in Australia).
135. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an
Environmental Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243 (2007).
136. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 186-88 (1980).
137. In the United States, courts have applied the public trust doctrine to
ensure, for example, the protection of public lands for climate change benefits and
the promotion of international principles of ecological sustainability. See generally
Paul A. Barresi, Mobilizing the Public Trust Doctrine in Support of Publicly
Owned Forests as Carbon Dioxide Sinks in India and the United States, 23 COLO.
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39 (2012).
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B. Land Ethics and the Doctrine of Propriety
Land ethics may be described as a set of normative connections
that humans make when interacting with the land.138 These
normative connections seek to delineate ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of
living on the land.139 In this way, land ethics are interconnected
with the ownership of land because they embody the concept of
property as ‘propriety.’ Propriety has an established
jurisprudential background.140 Conceptually, it stems from the
assumption that ownership is directly connected to social order
because it functions as a private entitlement that promotes public
good.141
Proprietarians generally assume that ‘public good’ has some
sort of comprehensible substantive denotation, despite its
conceptualization proving to be somewhat elusive. Public good is
not generally synonymous with the commodification of property
because market-oriented perspectives often obscure social welfare
values that seek to prevent behaviour that endangers the
livelihood of the communities in which owners reside.142 Hence,

138. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE 201 (1949) (where the term ‘land ethics’ was first used in this essay as an
organizing concept). For subsequent evaluation of this, see Eric Freyfogle, The
Land Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990) (where the
author argues that property is in ‘metamorphosis not decline’ and this shift is, in
part, attributable to its changing relationship with the natural environment).
139. For an interesting discussion on the connection between resource titles
and community norms, see Fred P. Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform,
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994).
140. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960, at 110-11 (1977); Richard F. Babcock & Duane A. Feurer, Land as a
Commodity ‘Affected with a Public Interest’, 52 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1977); C.
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986); Donald W. Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing
Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1039 (1973).
141. See RICHARD BARNES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2009)
(noting that the proprietarian perspective forces one to realize that property
indeed has a central role in ordering society and shaping social relations).
142. See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of
Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309,
330 (2006) (proposing a ‘citizenship model’ of ownership which seeks to confer
freedom and equality on all persons, and simultaneously places owners in the role
of guardians of social order).
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proprietarians would subordinate economic imperatives wherever
they are found to conflict with or threaten the social good.143
Fundamentally, proprietarianism examines the role that
property systems play in shaping community and social order.144
Owning land or natural resources necessarily involves taking
responsibility for the management and control of that land or
natural resource.145 Owners with a greater community values
instead of individuals voicing particularized entitlement
concerns.146 This connects with our shared perception of the
stewardship responsibilities held by all land and natural resource
owners who are taking care of a vital public resource rather than
controlling it.147 Land ethics foster a greater awareness and
appreciation of the collective nature of environmental and

143. Gregory S. Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 668
(1998).
144. See Alexander, supra note 54 (especially Part 1, The Civic Republican
Culture 1776-1800, where Alexander traces the connection between property and
social order within the civic republican era).
145. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269,
1295-97 (1993) (outlining the importance of land-owner responsibilities, which
include caring for and managing natural resources, in an environment where
sustainable living is a goal. The author goes on to suggest that: “by now we must
know that the land does not belong to us. We belong to it. Our charge is to avoid
injury to this enlarged community and if we can go further, to foster its health
and beauty.”).
146. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75,
87 (2010) (questioning whether we should continue to allow landowners
collectively to make decisions about the shared use of their interconnected land
or whether we force them to act alone and render indefeasible a public or collective
vision of development); see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom Promoting Approach
to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005)
(arguing that property law needs to be structured by a more refined
understanding of the meaning of liberty). See generally FRITJOF CAPRA & UGO
MATTEI, THE ECOLOGY OF LAW: TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN TUNE WITH NATURE
AND THE COMMUNITY (2015), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/pacelibrary/reader.action?
docID=11121699&ppg=2 [https://perma.cc/E9D2-X656] (arguing that a new ecolegal order has three strategic objectives: (i) to disconnect law from power and
violence (the nation-state); (ii) to make communities sovereign; and (iii) to make
ownership generative).
147. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 1857-58 (distinguishing between
‘exclusion property’ where one owner has full control over the asset and
enforceable rights are in rem in character, and ‘governance property,’ which are
regulated by wide-ranging internal governance norms including cooperation,
engagement and broader norms that contribute to the development of human
flourishing).
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sustainability concerns.148 All public and private land and natural
resources should be subjected to internal governance norms that
more effectively promote community engagement and mutual
cooperation. The core objective of a public resource system is for
the state to nurture macro dispositions of cooperation and in so
doing minimize interface collisions and satisfy public interest
duties.149
Integrating land ethics into the public resource framework will
also counter-balance the structural monism of ownership regimes
defined by the right to exclude. If one value system becomes
definitive of the entire normative framework, it necessarily
inhibits a greater understanding of differing value perspectives.150
Cooperative norms have a centrifugal focus. They are directed
away from the exclusionary core because they compel multidimensional
perspectives.151 The
heuristic
process
of
understanding and responding to community concerns requires
stronger ethical assimilation to ensure that the state and the
private owner exercise ownership entitlements in consonance with
broader public interest and social welfare imperatives.
IV. SOCIAL LICENSING OBLIGATIONS
A. Formative Concepts
The
importance
of
community
engagement
and
communitarian values for onshore resource development is clearly

148. See Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of Common Ownership, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1359, 1360 (2011) (arguing that properly designed, common ownership
‘forms’ can achieve a variety of policy goals that individualistic frameworks and
rights cannot and that this facilitates more cooperative and active communities).
149. Alexander, supra note 51, at 1884.
150. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2012) (arguing that sharing and cooperation within
existing ownership principles are a constitutive feature of the property institution
and concerns about insider’s governance may be as or even more important than
concerns regarding outsiders’ exclusion).
151. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1851-52 (2007) (arguing that norms operating beyond
the exclusion focus are refinements to the ‘core exclusionary regime’ of property);
Dagan, supra note 150, at 1419 n.38 (arguing that the conceptualization of
property as exclusion by Merrill and Smith amounts to “one of the most influential
accounts of structural monism”).
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apparent from the rise of what has become known as the social
license to operate. The social license to operate was a phrase
initially referenced at a 1997 World Bank meeting for the purposes
of mining and extractive industries. Community approval
processes have had a particular resonance in these contexts
because of the significant impact extractive industries have upon
the local environment in which they operate. This makes
improving transparency and gaining the support of affected
communities crucial.152 The same logic is applicable to all onshore
energy projects. Expanding resource development into new areas
traditionally associated with agriculture has created strong
environmental and social concerns that directly impact upon the
quality and livelihood of local communities
The social license to operate eludes precise definition, as it is,
in essence, a risk management strategy that has a particular
cogency in circumstances where public unease about industry
practices is strong. The fact that society is, in general, becoming
more attuned to the impact of resource development, particularly
those projects involving the extraction of fossil fuels, upon the
environment, the atmosphere and the landscape, means that
industry has had to become more adept at responding to the needs,
expectations and concerns of community stakeholders. This is
especially true in the context of onshore resource projects, which
are amenable to post-normal technologies, such that the impact
upon the landscape, the environmental and the community is often
unclear.153
The social license to operate is therefore a goal oriented,
negotiated tool utilized by industry to promote information
transparency and accountability and encourage community

152. See N.Z. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL, SOCIAL LICENCE TO OPERATE 4
(2013), https://www.sbc.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/99437/Social-Licenceto-Operate-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN7B-WLUC] (noting that the ‘social
licence’ terminology is now widely used in many sectors including” agriculture,
energy, manufacturing, mining, pharmaceutical, transport, telecommunications
and tourism).
153. See J. RAVETZ & S. FUNTOWICZ, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS: POST-NORMAL SCIENCE 1 (2003), http://leopold.asu.edu/sustainability/
sites/default/files/Norton,%20Post%20Normal%20Science,%20Funtowicz_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DY67-LNTL] (discussing the post-normal science explaining
that it characterizes a methodology of inquiry that is appropriate for cases where
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”).
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acceptance and involvement. The primary aim is to generate
strong community approval so as to minimize disruption. Gaining
approval is a multi-dimensional process that depends upon
voluntary acts of communication and disclosure surpass formal
legal processes. The assumption is that such will promote
community confidence because industry appears to be acting in a
‘legitimate, transparent and socially acceptable manner.’154
The rise in importance of the social license reveals the growing
importance of community engagement and risk management
protocols in the onshore resource sector.155 The social license now
has cogency within a range of different corporate areas
highlighting a growing preference for governance informed by the
input of impacted civil communities.156 It is legitimate to expect
that those most affected by the impacts of expanding resource
development should have the most to say about whether or not that
development should proceed.157 Social licensing is critical to the
progression of a sustainability paradigm for land and natural
resources because it optimizes the capacity of the community as a
whole to protect and preserve nature’s capital.158
B. Social Licensing and Corporate Strategy
There are some excellent examples of social licencing
processes that have achieved strong social welfare and community
engagement outcomes and in doing so, shifted corporate strategic
focus. One such example lies with Rio Tinto, a mining company

154. See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social
License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance,
29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).
155. See generally Austin Shaffer, Skylar Zilliox, & Jessica Smith,
Memoranda of Understanding and the Social Licence to Operate in Colorado's
Unconventional Energy Industry: A Study of Citizen Complaints, 35 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 69 (2017).
156. Ian Thomson, Understanding and Managing Public Reaction to
‘Fracking’, 33 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 266 (2015).
157. See Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of ‘Social
License to Operate’ in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and
Sustainability Theories, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 346 (2012).
158. Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers & Michael Burton, Measuring the Extent
of a Social License to Operate: The Influence of Marine Biodiversity Offsets in the
Oil and Gas Sector in Western Australia, 43 RESOURCES POL’Y 121, 122 (2015); see
also Smith & Richards, supra note 25, at 100.
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increasingly cognizant of the impact of the mining and natural
resource sector upon the health, environment and safety of
impacted, local communities. Rio Tinto has actively sought to
improve their relationship with community stakeholders by
ensuring, in accordance with the articulated United Nations
Millennium Development Goals, that every project has a localized
and publically reportable set of social performance indicators.159
These indicators demonstrate the economic contribution of the
project to the communities and the regions in which they operate
and include compliance with any negotiated local employment
targets.160 They also reveal the level of engagement of the company
with communities via jointly operated community programs and
strategic outreach facilities.161
For example, according to its annual report, in 2012 Rio Tinto
contributed US$292 million to over 2,700 socio-economic
programmes covering activities such as health, education, business
development, environmental protection, housing and agricultural
development.162 Rio Tinto were the largest private sector employer
of indigenous Australians and they actively sought to form
partnerships with universities, NGOs and industry to facilitate
research into global environmental and natural resource concerns
including biodiversity loss, climate change, water depletion and
contamination, environmental justice and corruption.163
The current strategic objective of Rio Tinto is to consistently
review, reassess and reframe their approach to ensure the material

159. See DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFF. OF THE U.N. SECRETARIAT,
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT, (2015), http://www.un.org/millennium
goals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20%28July%201%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4JR-D66N]; see also Sustainable Development 2012,
Engagement, RIOTINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/sustainabledevelopment2012/
governance/engagement.html [https://perma.cc/P964-UFCU].
160. See RIOTINTO, OUR APPROACH TO COMMUNITIES AND SOCIAL
PERFORMANCE (2012), http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_Rio_Tintos_appro
ach_to_communities_and_social_performance.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4Z3-NN
DZ]. This policy includes the objective of establishing local targets and
performance indicators on the basis of our social and economic knowledge base,
informed analysis and community engagement.
161. Id.
162. See Annual Report 2012 - Key Performance Indicators, RIOTINTO,
http://www.riotinto.com/annualreport2012/overview/key_performance_indicators
.html [https://perma.cc/B2XD-Q9PV].
163. Id.
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risks and concerns relevant to community stakeholders are
addressed and risk management is optimized.164 Community
engagement is a strong focus in this strategic plan. One
particularly successful example of this shift in strategic focus has
been in Michigan where, in addition to the environmental
oversight of state regulatory processes, an independent community
environmental monitoring program has been established at the
Eagle Mine at Humboldt Mill in order to examine the
environmental effects of a nickel and copper mine.165 Monitoring
focuses on groundwater and surface water resources, air quality,
flora and fauna.166 The community monitoring program, known as
the Superior Watershed Partnership, implements the community
monitoring program in collaboration with universities, contractors
and EPA approved laboratories.167 The project, which has been
well received, has involved the establishment of an oversight board
with representation from the community, the environmental
sector, the mining sector as well as the local indigenous population,
the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community.168 Community forums
have been held in a wide number of regions including: Marquette,
Big Bay, Humboldt and Michigamee and the discussion has
included not only existing and potential impacts but also future
proposals for monitoring improvement.169

164. RIOTINTO, 2016 STRATEGIC REPORT 29 (2016), http://www.riotinto.com/
documents/RT_2016_Strategic_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/932V-QLMA] (‘To
support our Communities and Social Performance target for 2016-2020, sites
began collecting data relating to the effective capture and management of
community complaints. All sites are required to have a complaints, disputes and
grievance mechanism in place in line with the effectiveness criteria for
operational-level grievance mechanisms.”).
165. Community Environmental Monitoring of the Rio Tinto Eagle Mine,
RIOTINTO (2012), http://swpcemp.org/wp-content/themes/cemp/pdfs/CEMP-Diag
ram.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH65-VCB3] [hereinafter Community Environmental
Monitoring Diagram].
166. Id.
167. Mine Monitoring, SUPERIOR WATERSHED P’SHIP & LAND TRUST, http://
swpcemp.org/monitoring/mine-monitoring [https://perma.cc/R9X9-RVD9].
168. Community Environmental Monitoring Diagram, supra note 165,
(discussing the framework for the program).
169. See SUPERIOR WATERSHED P’SHIP, 2016 WORK PLAN FOR THE COMMUNITY
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM OF THE EAGLE MINE 7 (2016), http://
swpcemp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CEMP-2016-Work-Plan_062016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WU79-TXFP].
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V. CONCLUSION
Ownership in land and natural resources invariably results in
the destruction or diminution of our human habitat.170 This is
because humans are fated to live on the planet and this means that
the pattern of land and resource entitlements adopted is critical to
social organization and progression. As Joseph Sax has stated,
“habitat inheres in land.”171 Our imaginative and moral
investment in our landscape and our community has always
surpassed its pure functionality as an ownership commodity.172
Despite this, deeply ingrained assumptions about rights to
exclusivity and autonomy endure.173 Private and public land and
resource owners have come to expect that, within their boundaries
and subject to negative externalities, they will be immunized
against state coercion or obligation.174 In the words of Carol Rose,
“[t]he property owner has a small domain of complete mastery,
complete self-direction, and complete protection from the whims of
others.”175 This stems from the libertarian belief that, in the
absence of harm, non-intervention should be the “presumptive

170. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847,
858 (2013) (noting that the interests of neighbouring landowners in the ecosystem
are not protected under traditional common law and public right theories do not
provide sufficient justification for uncompensated regulation of private property
to preserve critical environmental resources).
171. Sax, supra note 79, at 10 (arguing that the social relevance of land is
connected to its articulation as a ‘habitat’ which allows it to be conceived as a
component of the natural economy).
172. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY, FREEDOM COMMUNITY
AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 1-5 (2010) (discussing the economic rationalization
of property as a response to limited resources); see also Carol M. Rose,
Privatization: The Road to Democracy?, 33-34 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 106, 2006) (arguing that property is a legal
relationship that stimulates our imagination).
173. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND
ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007); see also Sax, supra note 79, at 2.
174. In Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), Justice Kagan concluded
in her comments that “[t]he law of property ‘naturally enough influences’ our
‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be free from governmental
incursions” (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006)) (referenced
by Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643,
701 n.359 (2014)).
175. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108
YALE L. J. 601, 604 (1998).
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posture of the state.”176 Ownership therefore confers a legal and
political sphere where individuals are free to exercise preference
without governmental or external coercion.
These entrenched attitudes have created profound relational
divisions between the individual, the state and the community.177
They have also impeded the capacity of the state, within a public
resource sector, to comply with its public interest mandate.178
Social contract theorists such as Hobbes support autonomous
ownership, arguing that private ownership is a benefit flowing
from the conferral of individual authority to the state.179
Ownership autonomy therefore represents the material foundation
for social order as it maximizes preference satisfaction and makes
resources more valuable.180 Similarly, Locke argued that this
implicit social contract, which exists as an idea of reason rather
than an assumption of fact, justifies the powers of the modern state
and forms the foundation of our social and legal order.181
These private law assumptions have, however, been
consistently challenged. Rousseau argued that the act of
ownership and the capacity of an individual to distinguish and
assert exclusivity and control split the self from the world. 182
Hence, autonomy removes the individual from the primary human
condition connecting them to nature as a whole. Thus humanity is
undone “if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and

176. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Renegotiating the Social Contract, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2012).
177. Alexander, supra note 143. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 54.
178. See Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A
Lakeside View into the Trustee's World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 176 (2012) (the
author discusses the legitimacy concerns that exist where public interest
considerations are influenced by private interests); Huffman, supra note 7, at 53
(noting that the history of public resource management is one of private interests
seeking benefits from public land resources.).
179. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999).
180. See CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 58, 62 (1994) (describing
the medieval and view of property as "propriety," because ownership carried social
and political responsibilities).
181. See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: This May Be True in
Theory But it Does Not Apply in Practice, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITING 61 (Han
Reiss ed., 1970); see also Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,
37 PHIL. Q. 127, 127 (1987).
182. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY
(Paul Negri & Greg Boroson eds., 2004) (1754).
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the earth to no one!”.183 Ownership autonomy means that land and
natural resources are treated as a fungible commodity, disengaged
from their social and ecological communities.
Public resource ownership is not subject to the same level of
autonomy as private resource ownership because it is moderated
by public interest responsibilities. It is not amenable to the
contractarian rationales that underlie private ownership
entitlements. Hence, the state must ensure that all autonomous
entitlements in public resources are managed in accordance with
communitarian responsibilities.184 Public resource ownership is
increasingly defined not by the capacity to exclude and control but
rather, by the right to harness social and community approval.
These rights reflect a growing differentiation between private and
public resource ownership. The growing importance of community
involvement within public resource development highlights our
evolving appreciation of ownership as a product of human
communities with a relational focus that is both “human-regarding
and object-regarding.”185
Public resource frameworks need to facilitate assessment
processes for onshore resource development that cohere with the
underlying philosophy of the ownership structure. State ownership
in natural resources is only justifiable if the state is appropriately
connected with the concerns of the community and is therefore
equipped to evaluate the interests and priorities of intersecting
interests. Autonomous ownership entitlements in public resources
must be exercised in accordance with the ‘calculus of social
interests’ via an evaluation process that integrates the needs,
expectations and interests of impacted communities.
Community is of course a dynamic concept. Communities
change and evolve over time meaning that public interest
assessments require readjustment. The norms and values that
existed when the public resource framework was first introduced
in Australia are no longer reflective of current attitudes. Social,

183. Id. at 24.
184. See Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and its Reality
as an Imperfect Alternative, 2 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2013) (arguing that the role of
property in modern society has evolved into a more communitarian notion).
185. Craig A. Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 332 (2002).
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environmental and community perspectives have progressed and
public interest protocols must reflect this.
In the current energy landscape communities need to be
properly and transparently informed about the scope and impact
of onshore resource development. This is particularly imperative
in a public resource framework where, in the absence of a public
trust doctrine, neither the public interest responsibilities of the
state nor the boundaries between state and private ownership
domains are clearly defined
Community representatives must be given the opportunity to
provide feedback and to engage with government and industry
during the assessment and approval process. The state must
actively satisfy itself that any proposed resource development is
consistent with the needs of the impacted community. This must
be a collaborative assessment process where the community is
informed and has the opportunity to respond. Community
engagement needs to be implemented at every stage of a resource
development project to ensure it is effective. This should include
feedback in the initial proposal and assessment, community
representation in all private access negotiations and community
involvement in all cumulative environmental monitoring,
management and rehabilitation programs.
Promoting a comprehensive and structured approach to
community engagement ensures that the public most affected by
the development is also the public most intricately involved in its
progression. Community values have always been inextricably
connected to the public resource ownership given the connectivity
between property and social order.186 Community engagement and
communitarian values are not integrated into the bundle of rights
that inform the core ownership framework because ownership
models evolved at a time when individual or indeed state
exploitation of natural resources was deemed to be a social good
and therefore automatically in the public interest.

186. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in NOMOS
XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223-47 (John Chapman ed., 1993) (arguing that
private property is an important component for the maintenance of social and
political order and proprietary).
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In a modern context, this must be balanced against the needs
of our eco-system as a whole.187 Onshore resource development has
the capacity to devastate communities and landscapes. With this
in mind, the normative assumptions that have long informed
public resource frameworks require adjustment. Regulatory
frameworks need to be updated. In Australia, the importance of
the public trust doctrine demands reconsideration. Public interest
responsibilities must be carefully rationalized because now, more
than ever, property norms need to mirror the contextual ethics
from which they have evolved.188

187. Freyfogle, supra note 18, at 639. For a discussion on the nature and
scope of land ethics, see Large, supra note 140, at 1082.
188. Freyfogle, supra note 18, at 637-38 (arguing that “[f]rom earliest-known
times, human communities found it useful to develop norms authorizing the
private control of land. . .” These norms were created by the community and “were
enforced only when and so long as the community stood behind them.”); see also
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 177 (1999) (arguing that
individuals within communities are capable of working out intricate sets of
internal rights, responsibilities and overarching norms of expected give and take).
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